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In this chapter, I try to answer the above question, and another question that it presupposes: 
How can philosophy of language help us navigate the news cycle? The presupposed question is: 
can philosophy of language help us navigate the political news cycle? A reader can be sceptical of 
a positive answer to the latter question; after all, citizens, political theorists, and journalists seem to 
be capable of following current politics and its coverage in the news, and there is no reason to think 
that philosophy of language in particular should be capable of helping people make sense and 
respond to the news. 
I should first clarify what I take philosophy and philosophy of language to be concerned 
with. I don’t mean to give a definition of philosophy, but merely an idiosyncratic and rough view of 
what I take myself to be engaged in. I take philosophy to be a critical, reflective, honest, and 
systematic investigation, carried out in dialogue with other people (dead or alive!), into the more 
fundamental and general topics that we, as humans, can care about in our relationship and 
experiences with the world and each other. It includes the reflection about whether we can know 
anything, how we can meaningfully communicate with each other, whether anything is right or 
wrong, good or bad, what is the meaning of life, if there’s any meaning in life, or how we should 
organize ourselves socially and politically.  
Philosophy of language, as you can guess, investigates how we can meaningfully 
communicate with each other. But philosophy of language is not philology: it does not study 
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particular languages such as Portuguese or Spanish. It is also not linguistics, although it is often 
informed by, and informs, research in linguistics. Philosophy of language investigates general 
concepts that are central to our use of language – meaning, reference, truth – and in relation to our 
linguistic capacity and practice as humans. 
It might be surprising, then, to ask such a concrete applied question as the title of this 
chapter does. In recent years, however, more and more philosophers of language are trying to 
understand what politicians say and mean, what their statements reveal about their plans, what they 
expect from voters, or which linguistic mechanisms are deployed in political propaganda. In the last 
decades, several philosophers of language have started to deploy their skills and theoretical tools 
(let’s call them that) to explain the differences between lying, misleading, and deceiving, and 
whether these have the same negative moral value. Or how politicians can convey racist or 
xenophobic messages, while plausibly denying doing so. Or, still, the semantic and pragmatic 
mechanisms operating in what George Orwell called doublethink and doublespeak.  
I’m just one among many female philosophers engaging in applied philosophy of language: 
Saray Ayala, Claudia Bianchi, Renée Bolinger, Elisabeth Camp, Laura Caponetto, Bianca 
Cepollaro, Esa Díaz-León, Robin Jeshion, Rae Langton, Mary Kate McGowan, Ishani Maitra, 
Eleonore Neufeld, Jennifer Saul, Marina Sbisá, Laura Schroeter, Rachel Sterken, or Lynne Tirell 
are just a few of the many women doing this kind of work. Now, I don’t have an explanation as to 
why there are so many female philosophers especially interested in applied philosophy. There’s a 
Wikipedia page on women in philosophy that portrays the low numbers of professional women in 
philosophy in the USA and the UK. Perhaps there’s a connection between being underrepresented 
in one’s profession and trying to make sense of concrete problems in the world, but this is a mere 
hypothesis that I am in no position to test. And it might be wrong! 
In the remaining of this chapter, I will illustrate the application of philosophy of language to 
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three contrasting strategies of political propaganda: dogwhistles, meaning perversions, and bald-
faced lies. I hope that these help us see that philosophy of language can be a good tool in 
diagnosing demagoguery, and in resisting it. 
 
1 Dogwhistles  
 
In 2011, before Obama’s re-election in 2012, Donald Trump tried to alarm people about that 
prospect: 
If we keep on this path, if we re-elect Barack Obama, the America we leave our kids and 
grandkids won’t look like the America we were blessed to grow up in. The American Dream 
will be in hock. The shining city on the hill will start to look like an inner-city wreck. (Trump, 
2011, Time to Get Tough: Making America #1 Again). 
Very notably, Trump uses words that have a real-world reference. He used “shining city on 
the hill” to refer to the United States, and used “inner-city wreck” to talk about city centres. Trump 
was not merely referring to the US or central urban areas. He was also conveying a contrasting 
positive and negative value by using those expressions. This additional conveyed message is not 
explicit in the sentences used. For simplicity, we can paraphrase what he explicitly said as “If we 
re-elect Obama, America will start to look like an inner-city wreck”. But what he implicitly 
conveys is rather “If we re-elect Obama, America will start to be dominated by poor, lazy, criminal 
black people.” In the US, as is discussed by Jennifer Saul, it is known that ‘inner city’ works as a 
way to negatively refer to black people (Tali Mendelberg, in her book, The Race Card, talks of 
such implicit political communication and how it can change the acceptability of racist 
discrimination in the US, mostly after the 1960s). Now, a racist dogwhistle, as a form of implicitly 
political communication, allows a speaker to violate a norm of racial equality with plausible 
deniability. In fact, a speaker like Trump can try to get away from accusations of racism with: “I 
didn’t say anything about race, you’re the one playing the race card!”  
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How can philosophy of language help us in understanding how dogwhistles convey such 
racist contents? Jennifer Saul distinguishes between overt and covert dogwhistles. Her distinction 
can be summarized as follows: 
Overt dogwhistles are designed with intent to allow two plausible interpretations: 
(i) a private content aimed at a desired target audience – for instance, George W. Bush’s use 
of ‘wonder-working power’ during an election as a dogwhistle to reach Christian 
evangelical fundamentalists, who would take it as a sign of faith in the power of Christ.  
(i) a plausible non-racist content for a broader audience. 
• Covert dogwhistles, for instance ‘inner city’ as used by Donald Trump above, are designed 
with intent to get an audience that disapproves, e.g., of explicitly racist speech, but who 
feels ok with apparently reasonable claims that are implicitly discriminatory. 
 
Now, there is quite a lot of debate about how exactly dogwhistles convey their implicit 
racist content and animate racial resentment. I can’t get into the details of this debate here. But a 
central feature especially of covert dogwhistles is that they allow for the negation, without 
contradiction, of the presumed racist content conveyed. In that regard, they contrast with other 
phrases that communicate something that is not explicitly stated or asserted. Consider for instance, 
the following: “It was Betty who bought the last copy of Invisible Women. No one bought the last 
copy of Invisible Women”. The first sentence seems to presuppose, but does not state, what is 
denied by the second sentence. Because of that, the two together appear contradictory. If there is 
any contradiction, it must be because the meaning of “it was Betty who did so-and-so” presupposes 
that so-and-so did happen. Now, in contrast, even if unlikely, Trump could have said, “If we re-
elect Obama, America will start to look like an inner-city wreck. But I don’t have anything against 
poor black people; my best friends are black and I donate to charities to help inner-cities.” There is 
no contradiction in saying both sentences in the same breath, although we could suspect that what 
came after “But I don’t…” is not sincere. 
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A second feature of dogwhistles is that the racist implicit content they convey can be 
reinforced and be mode more explicit. Yet, not all communicated content that is not explicitly 
asserted allows for this. Here’s what I mean. Suppose someone says “It was Betty who bought the 
last copy of Invisible Women; and what’s more, someone bought the last copy of Invisible Women!” 
The normal response to hearing these two sentences is to say “yeah, I know, you just said it was 
Betty who did it”.  
The lesson here is that content that is not asserted, but seems rather to be presupposed, is 
automatically accommodated by the audience (unless someone interrupts the speaker, saying for 
instance, “hey, wait a minute! I didn’t realize that…”). In the example I gave earlier, it is the 
proposition that someone bought the last copy of Invisible Women that is automatically 
accommodated. Unless someone objects with surprise, that proposition will now be taken for 
granted by the interlocutors. Moreover, it will sound redundant if it is explicitly asserted. In short, 
reinforcement sounds like redundancy. However, it would not be redundant for Trump to reinforce 
the implicitly racist message of his statement by adding something explicitly racist, for instance 
saying: “If we re-elect Obama, America will start to look like an inner-city wreck. And what’s 
more, I think that the guy is lazy. It’s probably not his fault, because laziness is a trait in blacks.” 
These two features of dogwhistles, that what they implicitly convey can be plausibly denied 
without contradiction, and that what they implicitly convey can be reinforced without redundancy, 
indicate that the implicit message is conveyed pragmatically. It would seem, then, that dogwhistles 
work as conversational implicatures, a notion introduced by Paul Grice. With an implicature, a 
speaker can imply one thing by saying something else. With conversational implicatures, speakers 
take advantage of cooperative conversational principles or maxims, such as the conversational 
maxims: Be truthful! Be relevant!  As an illustration of the maxim of relevance, if my best friend 
asks me if I’ll go to the concert next week, and I reply, “I’ve got to finish to grade my student’s 
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papers” she will take me to mean that I cannot go to the concert, although I did not say so out loud. 
She can infer that is what I meant because she assumes that I what say is a relevant answer 
I think that dogwhistles depend on something like conversational implicatures, although this 
is not the place to make that argument. Intuitively, the motivating idea can be easily grasped: What 
is the relevance of bringing up city centres, which (the audience presumably assumes) are 
overpopulated, crime-ridden, and whose population is mostly, while advising against re-electing 
the first black president? Unless there is some connection between the two, the audience would not 
take the speaker to be saying something relevant. 
As I said earlier, I won’t have the space here to explain how I think that pragmatic process 
operates. But I want to point to an effect of the use of racist dogwhistles. It seems that the implicit 
political content they communicate nonetheless succeeds in changing what speakers take for 
granted, in particular, in changing the social norms that regulate permissible behaviour. This is, 
perhaps, the most serious consequence of the use of dogwhistles in political propaganda. The lesson 
here is that we should make sure whether we are accepting something that sounds reasonable, and 
perhaps even true, but at the same time acquiescing to racist or xenophobic attitudes. Knowing how 
dogwhistles actually work (semantically or pragmatically) is hence important to properly asses their 
impact, and respond to coded discourse. 
 
2 Meaning perversions 
In an excellent article from 2017 in the New York Review of Books, “The Autocrat’s Language”, 
the journalist and writer Masha Gessen wrote: 
A Russian poet named Sergei Gandlevsky once said that in the late Soviet period he became 
obsessed with hardware-store nomenclature. He loved the word secateurs, for example...In a 
world where words were constantly used to mean their opposite, being able to call secateurs 
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“secateurs”—and nothing else—was freedom. “Freedom,” on the other hand, was, as you 
know, slavery. That’s Orwell’s 1984. And it is also the USSR, a country that had “laws,” a 
“constitution,” and even “elections,” also known as the “free expression of citizen will...” 
There was  nothing free about it, it did not constitute expression, it had no relationship to 
citizenship or will because it granted the subject no agency... it eviscerated the words 
“election,” “free,” “expression,” “citizen,” and “will,” and it also left the thing itself 
undescribed... an experience that could be accurately described as, say, an “election,” or 
“free,” had been preemptively discredited because those words had been used to denote 
something entirely different.  
The examples that Gessen gives of words whose meaning is perverted in the mouth of the 
autocrat recall what George Orwell called doublespeak and doublethink. It is no accident that she 
mentions Orwell’s 1984 and one of the doublethink pairs from the book: “freedom is slavery”. So, 
what do propaganda slogans like “The free expression of citizens will!” do? They seem to exploit 
the normative or evaluative connotation of literal sincere uses of a phrase. For instance “Free 
homeland!” seems to have a positive connotation as good and desirable, whereas “the enemy of the 
people” is just the opposite. That positive value of “free” is exploited to induce acceptance of the 
regime and its practices. To refer to the ritual in the former USSR as a “free election” would make 
it hard to resist the regime’s control  – A citizen would be faced with questions like “how can you 
be against the free exercise of citizens will?” 
My view is that meaning perversions are undermining norm-enforcements. While they 
appear to rely on, and enforce, shared norms or values (of justice, politics, or morality), they 
actually undermine and erode those very same norms. In other words, they are like a wolf in 
sheep’s skin. Meaning perversions differ from dogwhistles in significant aspects. While meaning 
perversions exploit pre-existing normative connotations that are common knowledge, and use word 
to denote an unsuitable referent, for instance, ‘freedom’ to talk about slavery, or ‘free expression of 
citizen will’ for a compulsory ritual that is not an exercise of citizens’ agency. Dogwhistles in 
contrast are words that are used to denote their proper referents, while used to convey that those 
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referents have a positive or negative value that in fact they lack. Now, with a dogwhistle, a speaker 
can deflect criticism of the implicitly conveyed content with plausible deniability – “I didn’t say 
anything about race, you’re the one playing the race card again!” In contrast, with a meaning 
perversion, the speaker can deflect criticism by appearing to enforce, while undermining, the norms 
or values the word actually connotes: “How can you: be against free elections? Against democracy? 
The will of the people? Taking back control? Defend an enemy of the people?” 
We should pay attention and check if the norms and values that are being conveyed in 
political discourse actually fit the things the speaker is talking about – free elections are a good and 
desirable thing, but what if the speaker is referring to a process that is coerced and is not the 
exercise of political deliberation by all citizens in equal conditions? Contemporary examples 
abound. For instance, the slogan “take back control” used by the Leave campaign during the 2016 
Brexit referendum presupposes that British people lost control (of what, exactly?) at some point, so 
it would be a good thing for Britons to exercise their autonomy and regain control over their 
political future. But what if Britain never lost control – not in any relevant sense, at least – and 
leaving the European Union is in fact a way to lose not just political but also financial control of the 
future of the UK?  
The lesson here is that we should pay attention and check if by accepting something 
apparently desirable we are actually buying into something against our best interests. The media 
has an option in deciding whether to repeat political discourse as it is produced – including 
dogwhistles and the doublespeak, or to paraphrase it with the correct connotations of norms and 
values, and denoting the right referents. Deliberation in liberal democratic societies requires that 
journalists and regular citizens are aware that they should make their decisions on the basis of a 
reflective and critical assessment of political demagoguery. This brings us to the last case study I 
will discuss. 
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3 Bald-faced lies 
Everybody lies, and naturally all politicians lie. But not everyone lies brazenly, all the time, 
with confidence, and without trying to conceal that what they say is false. Those who do so with 
such blatant shamelessness – bald-faced liars – can pose a particular kind of threat to others when 
they enter the public political domain. In 2017, the New York Times published what it regrettably 
called “The Definitive List of Donald Trump’s Lies”, which was definitely not definitive (at the 
end of 2019 the Washington Post reported that Trump had lied as a president over 15 000 times). 
Here’s an excerpt, from only half of October 2017, from the New York Times article. Trump’s 
claims are followed with fact-checking (there were links to relevant news articles in the original): 
Oct. 16 “I hear that Ireland is going to be reducing their corporate rates down to 8 percent from 12.” 
(Ireland has no plans to cut its tax rate.) Oct. 16 “If you look at President Obama and other presidents, 
most of them didn’t make calls.” (They did call families of soldiers killed in action.) Oct. 16 “All I can 
say is it's totally fake news, just fake. It's fake. It's made-up stuff, and it's disgraceful what happens, but 
that happens in the world of politics.” (Trump himself has bragged about groping women.)…  Oct. 17 
“Right now, we are the highest-taxed nation anywhere in the world. You can even say developed or 
undeveloped.” (We're not.) Oct. 17 “As far as I'm concerned, I think we're really essentially the highest. 
But if you'd like to add the developed nation, you can say that, too.” (Taxes in the U.S. are lower than in 
most developed countries.)… Oct. 17 “I wish President Obama didn't get out the way he got out. 
Because that left a vacuum and ISIS was formed.” (The group’s origins date to 2004.) Oct. 
18 “Democrat Congresswoman totally fabricated what I said to the wife of a soldier who died in action 
(and I have proof).” (The wife confirmed Representative Frederica Wilson's account.) Oct. 18 “The 
Coast Guard in Texas saved 16,000 lives.” (The real number was smaller.) Oct. 18 “Nobody has ever 
heard of a five hitting land.” (Category 5 storms have hit land before.) Oct. 24 “Under our plan, more 
than 30 million Americans who own small businesses will get a 40 per cent cut to their top marginal tax 
rate.” (The real number is estimated to be less than 1 million.) Oct. 25 “We have trade deficits with 
almost everybody.” (We have trade surpluses with more than 100 countries.) Oct. 27 “Wacky & totally 
unhinged Tom Steyer, who has been fighting me and my Make America Great Again agenda from 
beginning, never wins elections!” (Steyer has financially supported many winning candidates.) 
 
It is either common ground that each of those claims are lies, or it can be easily learned 
since the correct information is publicly available. But what is the effect of such a deluge of lies on 
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public discourse? In January 2019, Dahlia Lithwick correctly diagnosed the problem in an article in 
Slate: “We’ve grown so hopelessly accustomed to a journalism reduced to daily fact checking, and 
a politics reduced to daily fact checking, and fact checking reduced to daily white noise that we 
forget that there is more to daily public life than endlessly correcting the record.” The effects of 
such ‘daily white noise’ on democratic deliberation are very serious. This deluge of blatant 
shameless lies is a means of dominating the conversation, manipulating the public, and ultimately 
controlling reality. Here, philosophy of language can once more help us to understand the 
mechanism at work.  
An effect of having our beliefs and knowledge contradicted with such confidence – what 
the philosopher J.L. Austin called a perlocutionary effect – is that we often start to doubt what we 
previously took for granted. This is a psychological effect, studied as gaslighting. We can deploy 
good semantic and pragmatic theories to explain what the bald-faced liar is doing, and not just the 
effects of his actions. The bald-faced liar blatantly violates what Paul Grice called The Cooperative 
Principle of conversations of which the conversational maxims I referred to earlier are a part (Be 
truthful! Be relevant! etc).  
The Cooperative Principle says: Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage 
at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are 
engaged. The principle assumes that cooperative participants in a conversation try consider the 
purposes and interests of the conversational setting, as well as other things that they take for 
granted; and in so doing they should be truthful, perspicuous, relevant, not redundant, etc. But a 
bald-faced liar blatantly ignores or violates the accepted shared purposes of conversations. He 
confidently, and shamelessly, says what is commonly known, that is, taken for granted, to be false, 
and in so doing indicates that he is not interested in being cooperative. Rather, he forces others to 
accept his purposes and to control the direction of the conversation. In politics, in particular, this 
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strategy can have tremendous effects: the replacement of the joint deliberative process of open 
debate that is central to liberal democracies with the assertion of power and domination of 
autocracy. As Masha Gessen wrote in another 2016 article in the New York Review of Books, “The 
Putin Paradigm”: 
Lying is the message. It’s not just that both Putin and Trump lie, it is that they lie in the same 
way and for the same purpose: blatantly, to assert power over truth itself. Take, for example, 
Putin’s statements on Ukraine. In March 2014 he claimed that there were no Russian troops in 
newly annexed Crimea; a month later he affirmed that Russians troops had been on the 
ground. Throughout 2014 and 2015, he repeatedly denied that Russian troops were fighting in 
eastern Ukraine; in 2016 he easily acknowledged that they were there. In each case, Putin 
insisted on lying in the face of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and in each case 
his subsequent shift to truthful statements were not admissions given under duress: they were 
proud, even boastful affirmatives made at his convenience... Putin’s power lies in being able to 
say what he wants, when he wants, regardless of the facts.  
 
We can, and should, understand what the point of such brazen lying is, and should think of 
our role in public debate, either as journalists or as individual citizens. Political opposition and 
differences of opinion are not only legitimate in democracies, but are one of the fundamental bases 
of democracy itself. Deliberative democracy is based on the idea that all people are fundamentally 
equal in rights and obligations under the law, and that other parties – whatever their status or views 
– are equally legitimate participants in public life. Strong disagreement and opposition are 
legitimate in democracy. But they require a common ground of truth and facts, of trust in rational 
ways to find out what our reality is before we decide what to do, of respect for the legitimacy of 
differences of opinion, and respect for the rule of law and for the institutions that protect 
democratic participation and representation.  
Understanding mechanisms of political demagoguery such as dogwhistles, meaning 
perversions, or bald-faced lies, is necessary to understand and respond appropriately to the threats 
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they pose to rational deliberation in democratic societies. This brief chapter serves as an illustration 
of how philosophy of language can help us navigate the political news cycle, and, I hope, confirms 
that philosophy of language can indeed help us make sense of political debate.  
 
